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This report is an engineering study of the field performance of open span low-
rise steel frame structures that have been subjected to extreme wind events such
hurricanes and tornadoes. The wind velocities in these events either approached
slightly exceeded the normal design values specified in ASCE 7-95. This report
focuses specifically on the performance of heavy steel structures and does not include
pre-engineered metal buildings. All types of building failures are observed and
analyzed in this report, including roofing and secondary cladding component failures
as well as main structural failures. In each case study, the probable cause of failure is
determined and through an analysis of the different case studies, patterns of failure are
identified. Through an analysis of the patterns of failure, recommendations for general
design improvements are made and areas requiring further study are identified.
The study found that the main structural systems of heavy steel structures
performed very well in these extreme winds. Virtually no damage was observed to
any of the components of the main structural systems of the buildings, even when the
wind velocities exceeded design values by as much as 30 percent. However, the
components and cladding did not perform as well. In almost every instance of failure,
at least some portion of the roof decking was removed. In most cases the damaged
area was restricted to the windward edge of the roof/wall intersection. Another weak
component was the overhead doors. In over half of the instances of damage, the
overhead door was the first point of failure. The failure of the overhead door(s) then
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Each year in the United States wind storms, such as hurricanes and tornadoes,
cause more economic losses than any other natural phenomenon (Simiu et al., 1996).
Hurricanes are typically much larger storms than tornadoes and cause more economic loss
per storm, but tornadoes are typically more intense and they occur more frequently. As
late as the 1970's, experts thought tornadoes produced wind speeds in excess of 600 mph
and subsequently thought that it was impossible to design a structure to resist tornadic
wind loads. Researchers have recently dispelled these myths and have proven that the
wind speeds generated by tornadoes range from 80 mph up to 300 mph. Even though the
wind speeds in tornadoes can reach velocities approaching 300 mph, over 85% of all
tornadoes have maximum wind speeds below 150 mph, (McDonald et al., 1987). This
means that normal engineered structures can be economically designed to resist the wind
loads generated by over 85% of all tornadoes.
The combined damage resulting from tornadoes, hurricanes, and other wind
events have accounted for approximately 70% of all insured losses in the last ten years, as
shown in Figure 1.1.

Cumulative Insured Catastrophic Losses
1986 - 1995
(Total Losses S78.5 Billion)
SOther Explosion/Fire
Riot/Civil Disorder Earthquake/Fire
Wind/Hail Tornadoes D Hurricanes/Tropical Storms
Figure 1.1 Cumulative Insured Losses 1986 to 1995 (PCS, 1996)
Along with their cumulative effects, individual tornadoes and hurricanes can be
devastating. The damage from an individual hurricane can run as high as $30 billion
dollars as it did for Hurricane Andrew in 1992, (Greenberg, 1994). Table 1 . 1 below,
provides a list of some of the most devastating hurricanes that have hit the United States
in the last 50 years (Palm Beach Post, 1996).
Table 1 . 1 Most Devastating Hurricanes
Damage
Hurricane Year Category (Millions)
Andrew 1992 4 30,000
Hugo 1989 4 7,160
Betsy 1965 3 6,460
Agnes 1972 1 6,420
Camille 1969 5 5,240
Diane 1955 1 4,200
New England 1938 3 3,590
Frederic 1979 3 3,500
Alicia 1983 3 2,390

It is important to note that the damage estimates listed in the previous table have been
adjusted to equivalent 1994 dollar values. Although the damage estimates in Table 1.1
and Figure 1.1 include damage to items other than structures, they do give an appreciation
for the amount of damage caused by these storms. The extreme damage and loss of life
produced by these high wind events has prompted a sub-specialty within civil
engineering, called "wind engineering". Through the development of this specialized
area and through extensive research, much knowledge has been gained within the last ten
years about the loading induced on buildings and other structures by high winds. This
report focuses specifically on the performance of low-rise steel structures during medium
and high wind events. Through investigation of the performance of actual structures,
conclusions can be reached about the adequacy of the current wind codes and
construction practices.
Low-rise steel structures can be broadly divided into two main categories, heavy
and light steel structures. Heavy steel structures are typically fully engineered buildings
that utilize standard American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) wide flange sections
for columns and either wide flange sections or custom designed trusses for beams and
girders. Heavy steel structures typically perform well in severe wind events because they
are fully engineered and have a high degree of redundancy in the structural systems.
Heavy steel structures are enclosed with a number of different types of exterior cladding.
Some of the more popular types of cladding are corrugated steel or aluminum siding,
normal clay masonry and concrete masonry units (CMU). These exterior claddings and
veneers are used both alone, and in combinations.

Light steel structures are typically pre-engineered or partially engineered
structures. These light steel structures are usually made up of either single bay rigid
frames (such as a standard pre-engineered metal building) or tubular steel columns with
standard open web steel joists. The exterior cladding used for these light steel structures
is similar to the cladding used for heavy steel structures. Light steel structures typically
have little or no redundancy in their structural system, particularly the portions of the
system that resist lateral and uplift wind loads. The lack of structural redundancy in these
structures is perhaps the single most common cause of their failure during high winds.
1.1 Purpose of the Study
The goal of this forensic engineering study is to objectively evaluate the field
performance of low-rise open span heavy steel structures that have been subjected to
extreme wind events. The performance of each of the structures studied in this report is
evaluated and patterns of failure are noted and analyzed. After the patterns are identified
and analyzed, recommendations for improving the performance of these structures are
presented. Finally, the report endeavors to either suggest code modifications or
recommend areas requiring further study.
1 .2 Scope of the Study
As stated earlier, this report examines the performance of open span low-rise
heavy steel structures subjected to high wind events. In particular, the strengths and
weaknesses of this type of structure are observed and recorded. The information and
photographs used in this report were primarily obtained from field investigations of over
70 storm events made by faculty and students working at the Institute for Disaster

Research (IDR) at Texas Tech University. It is important to note that without the
countless hours and dedication of the faculty and staff at Texas Tech University, this
report would have been impossible to produce.
Building damage and failures resulting from the following high wind events are
included in this report: Hurricanes Frederic (1979), Gilbert (1988), Hugo (1989), and
Andrew (1992), along with a tornado at Altus, OK (1982). Since these hurricanes and
tornadoes subjected many steel structures to the design level wind velocities specified in
ASCE 7-95, they provide unique opportunities to objectively evaluate the field




The accurate determination and interpretation of recorded wind velocity
information is an important element in the analysis of the damage done by any wind
event. To understand and properly interpret the wind velocity information, there are two
fundamental concepts about wind flow that must be understood. One concept is that
wind velocity varies with height. The second concept deals with the averaging time of a
set of anemometer data. A detailed explanation of these two concepts is given in the
following paragraphs to provide the background information necessary for understanding
the remainder of the material in this report.
Since the velocity of wind varies with the height above ground, it is important to
note the recording height of an anemometer reading. The wind speeds are generally
lowest at ground level and increase with increasing elevation above the ground. In fact,
the wind speed is assumed to be zero at ground level and assymtotically approaches an
undisturbed maximum value at a particular height above the ground. This height is called
the gradient height and varies depending on the roughness of the terrain and the number
and size of the structures in the area. Although the normal distribution of wind speed
versus height has been proven to accurately model straight winds, experts are still trying
to determine whether it is valid for the distribution of wind speeds in hurricanes and
tornadoes. The current theory held by many prominent wind experts is that the wind
speed distribution does hold true for hurricanes and tornadoes. This theory is supported
by the similarity of the damage patterns produced by all wind events.

As mentioned earlier, the other item that is critical to the understanding and use of
reported wind speeds is the averaging time. The averaging time of the wind speed record
can have a significant impact on the reported value of any given wind speed. Since wind
speeds fluctuate greatly, the reported velocities will be much lower if the averaging time
of the sample is increased. This phenomenon is most easily understood by studying an
actual wind speed record, such as the one shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 Typical 15-Minute Wind Speed Record (Texas Tech WERFL Site)
If a three second averaging time is chosen, the maximum wind speed reported for the
record shown in Figure 2.1 would be close to 30 mph. If a three minute averaging time is
chosen, the reported wind speed would be approximately 22 mph, which is an average of
the wind speed records between 9 and 12 minutes. As shown by this example, the
maximum average wind speed reported for a given set of data can vary greatly depending

on the averaging interval. An accurate comparison of wind speeds from different storms
can only be made if the reported maximum wind speeds are obtained at the same height,
using the same averaging time. If all reporting conditions are not the same, conversions
must be made to make a comparison of the data meaningful. Since the prevailing wind
standards now use the maximum sustained three second gust recorded at 33 feet (10
meters) above ground level as the standard, all wind speeds presented in this paper have
been converted to this standard. The conversions were made using the logarithmic law as
recommended by Simui and Scanlan, 1996. The equations for the logarithmic law along
with the conversion calculations are included in Appendix A.
The high wind events mentioned in this report are categorized using the Saffir-
Simpson Scale for hurricanes and the Fujita Scale for tornadoes. Both the Saffir-Simpson
and the Fujita Scales provide a means of quickly rating and comparing the strength of a
hurricane or tornado. While tornadoes are primarily rated by an assessment of the
damage they produce, hurricanes are rated based primarily on maximum wind speed.
Along with the maximum wind speed, the Saffir-Simpson scale uses the height of the
tidal surge to categorize hurricanes. The Saffir-Simpson scale ranks the strength of a
hurricane on a scale of one to five and is broken down as shown in the following table.












It is important to note, that the averaging time and sampling height of the wind speed data
used in the Saffir-Simpson scale are not specified (Simiu et al., 1996). Since these
parameters are necessary for the use of the wind data in structural calculations, the Saffir-
Simpson scale can only be used as a qualitative measurement of hurricane intensity.
The Fujita scale, which was developed to categorize the intensity of tornadoes, is
broken into six different levels. Each level describes a particular degree of damage. Only
in recent years have corresponding wind speeds been assigned to the Fujita scale. The
Fujita scale is broken down as shown in Table 2.2.









1 73-112 79-117 Moderate
2 113-157 118-161 Considerable
3 158-206 162-209 Severe
4 207 - 260 210-261 Devastating
5 261-318 262-317 Incredible
The averaging time for the Fujita scale is specified. The Fujita scale uses the maximum
one-quarter mile wind speed for its standard. The one-quarter mile wind speed is fastest
average wind speed obtained for a quarter of a mile of wind passing an anemometer.
Both the one-quarter mile and the three second gust wind speeds are given in Table 2.2.
It is important to note that the categories in the Saffir-Simpson and the Fujita scales are
used in the following chapters only to describe the relative intensity of the high wind
events that affected the subject structures.

2.1 Evolution of the United States Wind Load Standard
The first modern standard for the calculation of wind loads on structures was
published by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1972 and was
designated ANSI A58.1-1972. Along with the wind load provisions in this standard, it
also included the minimum design criteria for dead loads, live loads, snow loads, rain
loads and earthquake loads. However, due to ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
terminology used in the section of the standard that governed wind loading, it never
gained widespread acceptance, (Mehta et al., 1991). In 1976 a cross-functional, 46
member committee was established to revise the wind provisions of the ANSI A58.1-
1972 standard. This committee was established following a conference at Northwestern
University where valuable input was obtained from practicing engineers, building code
representatives, and industry personnel. The 46 member committee revamped the wind
provisions of the 1972 standard and published a revised edition of ANSI A58.1 in 1982.
Three major improvements were made in this revised standard. First, much of the
ambiguous language was clarified. Second, the new standard included codified criteria
requiring designers to account for the high localized pressures produced at areas of flow
separation. The final improvement made to the standard was the introduction of a new
design velocity contour map. The revised contour map was based on fastest mile wind
velocities obtained at 33 feet instead of 30 feet, as was used for the 1972 map. The
change to the maximum wind speed obtained at 33 feet above the ground surface
increased the design velocities in many areas. These three major changes made ANSI
A58.1-1982 the first standard that was widely accepted in the United States for the
calculation of wind loads on structures.
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The responsibility for the A58.1 wind code was transferred to the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in 1985. After minor revisions, the ASCE published a
new standard, ANSI/ASCE 7-88, in 1990. This revised version of ANSI A58.1-1982 and
especially the commentary on the use of the wind load provisions were a great
improvement over the old standard. The revised standard provided a better format,
consolidating all of the wind provisions and charts in one section. The commentary
provided background information on the development of the wind provisions so the
practicing engineer could get a quick explanation of the basis of the provisions along with
a more in-depth explanation of how to interpret the standard. In 1993, the wind sub-
committee further refined the ASCE wind standard and published ASCE 7-93. Virtually
no substantive changes were made to the wind provisions in the ASCE 7-93 standard. In
1995, the wind sub-committee again revised the wind standard and published ASCE
7-95. ASCE 7-95 is the current standard that is used today. The primary change in the
ASCE 7-93 standard was a revised design wind velocity map. In the new map, the wind
subcommittee used a maximum three second gust instead of the fastest mile wind speed
that had been utilized in all codes prior to ASCE 7-95. Even though the use of the three
second gust resulted in higher design velocities, the design wind loads on the majority of
the structures did not change significantly due to modifications to the pressure
coefficients in the ASCE 7-95 standard. The differences between the two standards can
be readily seen by comparing the design wind velocity contour maps from ASCE 7-88,
which is identical to the 7-93 map, and ASCE 7-95. The velocity contour maps from
these standards are shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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Figure 2.2 Design Wind Velocity Contour Map - ASCE 7-88
Special Wind Region
Population Center
Location V mph (m/s)
Hawaii 105 (47)
Puerto Rico 125 (56)
Guam 170 (76)
Virgin Islands 125 (56)






Notes: 1 . Values are 3-second gust speeds In miles pet houf (nVs) at 33 It
(10m) above ground for Exposure C category and are associated
with an annual portability of 0.02
2. Linear interpolation between wind speed contours Is permitted.
3. Islands and coastal areas shall use wind speed contour ol coastal
area.
A. Mountainous ten-aln, gorges, ocean promontories, and special
regions shall be examined for unusual wind conditions.
Figure 2.3 Design Wind Velocity Contour Map - ASCE 7-95
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2.2 Methods of Analysis
One of the most difficult tasks to accomplish when conducting an engineering
investigation of storm damage is obtaining a reliable estimate of the wind speeds that
caused the damage. Over the years, engineers have developed four main ways to estimate
the wind speeds generated by a storm. The first method is to analyze the damage done to
residences and rural buildings, by wind generated missiles. Because of the wide range of
construction practices used to build these structures and the dynamic complexities
involved with missile impacts, this type of analysis provides estimates that are
questionable (Mehta, 1976). The second method is the analysis of framed structures or
conventional buildings that have been damaged or destroyed. Again because of variation
in construction techniques and materials, this method provides estimates that are only
acceptable (Mehta, 1976). The third method used is a detailed analysis of "simple"
structures that have either been damaged or have failed. Some examples of these
"simple" structures include signs, light poles, single column canopies, bridge beams, and
towers. Since the structures are very simple, the analysis typically provides good
estimates of wind speeds (Mehta, 1976; Marshall et al., 1983). The fourth method is to
obtain wind speed records from anemometers that were located in the path of the storm.
This method provides excellent confidence in the reported values, but unfortunately, this
data is normally not available. Even when the data is available, it must be carefully
validated and the height and averaging time must be converted to standard values before
the data can be used.
Since many of the structures that are studied in this report were located on military
installations or close to airports, reliable direct anemometer readings were readily
13

available. The only problem with direct anemometer data is that the averaging times,
exposure conditions, and sampling heights sometimes vary. As stated in the background
discussion of this chapter, all the wind speeds reported in this report are for a three
second gust on open ground at a sample height of 33 feet (10 meters). The anemometer
data that did not conform to this standard was converted using the equations and methods
recommended by Simiu and Scanlan, 1996.
Where reliable data was not available, wind speeds were estimated based on the
loads required to cause the failure of "simple" adjacent structures. The analysis of these
simple structures was performed in accordance with the general wind load provisions of
Section 6 ofASCE 7-95 and can be found in Appendix A. Along with the analysis of the
"simple" structures, the wind load provisions of Section 6 of ASCE 7-95 were also used
for the analysis of loads on the structures studied in this report. The general equation
used to calculate the wind loads on the structures is provided below.
qz = 0.00256*KZ*I*V
2
qz = velocity pressure evaluated at height z, in pounds per square foot (psf)
Kz = wind pressure exposure coefficient evaluated at height z
I
= importance factor of the structure
V = basic design wind speed (mph)
Once qz is obtained, it is used to calculate the design wind pressure, p. The design
pressure is calculated using qz , and several coefficients that account for the specific
conditions of the site and the properties of the building. Some of the coefficients that
account for the site conditions include a gust effect factor, internal pressure coefficients,
and external pressure coefficients. The design pressure is then multiplied by the





The meteorological information in this section is provided to add meaning to the
damage discussed in the next chapter. The meteorological information about the storms
was obtained from the Purdue University Atmospheric Sciences database via the Internet.
The origin, path, and the strength of each storm is provided to give an indication of the
wind speeds and storm direction at each of the damage sites studied. Along with this
specific information about the individual hurricanes, it is also helpful to understand the
general principles of the formation and growth of hurricanes.
Hurricanes are formed when a cool moist air mass passes over a warmer body of
water. As the moist air mass passes over the warm water, the air mass absorbs moisture
and the air begins to spin, thus forming a column and a tropical depression. As additional
moist air rises and strengthens the storm, the entire air mass surrounding the column
begins to travel in a circular motion around the column. This process continues as long
as the system is supplied with a large body of warm water and as long as the temperature
differential between the water and the air mass is maintained. The storm is classified as a
hurricane when the parameters in Table 2.1 are met.
All of the hurricanes that caused the subject damage began as tropical depressions
at various locations in the Atlantic Ocean and made landfall in the southern or
southeastern United States. Detailed information on each of the hurricanes is described
later in this chapter. The hurricanes are discussed in chronological order with no regard
to the severity of the damage or intensity of the storm. The following color scheme is
15

used to represent the severity of the hurricanes in Figures 3.1 to 3.5: Green - tropical
depression, yellow - tropical storm, red - category 1 hurricane, light red - category 2
hurricane, magenta - category 3 hurricane, light magenta - category 4 hurricane, and black
- category 5 hurricane. The stars on the hurricane tracking maps indicate the approximate
location of the damaged structures.
3 . 1 Hurricane Frederic
Hurricane Frederic began as a tropical depression on August 29, 1 979 at latitude
1
1° North and longitude 25° West. Frederic's initial position was approximately 2,500
miles east of the north end of South America. The storm took a westerly course and
strengthened slightly as it moved toward the Caribbean. Before it reached tropical storm
strength, it made landfall on various islands in the Caribbean. After continuing its
easterly track and clearing Cuba, it quickly turned north and headed toward the
Mississippi-Alabama border. When it made landfall on September 12, 1979 between
Pascagoula, Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama, it had reached category 4 strength. For
the purposes of this report, the area of interest is near Mobile, Alabama. The eye of
Hurricane Frederic passed less than 100 miles to the east of Mobile. Maximum wind
speeds of between 100 and 110 mph were recorded by the National Weather Service
(NWS) at the Mobile Airport and by the Coast Guard Cutter, Salvia when Frederic passed
over Mobile (Mehta et al., 1981 ; Reinhold, 1979). An illustration showing the track of
this hurricane and its corresponding strength can be seen in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3. 1 Tracking Map for Hurricane Frederic
3.2 Hurricane Gilbert
Hurricane Gilbert began as a tropical depression on September 8, 1988 at latitude
12° North and longitude 54° West. Gilbert's initial position was approximately 500 miles
east of the north end of South America. The storm took a west to northwesterly course
and strengthened to a category 3 hurricane before making landfall on the Caribbean
island of Jamaica. It then strengthened to a category 5 hurricane as it crossed the
Caribbean Sea and made landfall on the southern portion of the Yucatan Peninsula.
Gilbert weakened to a category 3 hurricane as it crossed the southern tip of Mexico but
gained strength to category 4 as it entered and crossed the Gulf of Mexico. By the time
the storm entered the United States through the southwestern border of Texas, it had
weakened to a tropical depression. Although the continental United States did not
17
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receive much direct damage from Hurricane Gilbert, it spawned a number of tornadoes
that caused considerable damage in the South Texas area. One of these tornadoes caused
the damage to the structures that were investigated in this report. These structures were
located on Kelly Air Force Base (AFB) in San Antonio, Texas, which is over 200 miles
away from the path of the hurricane. An illustration of the track of this hurricane and
the location of Kelly AFB can be seen in Figure 3.2.
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Hurricane Hugo began as a tropical depression on September 10, 1989 at latitude
13° North and longitude 20° West. Hugo's initial position was approximately 300 miles
west of Sengal, Africa. The storm took a westerly course and gained strength as it moved
toward the Caribbean. As the storm entered the Caribbean, it turned to the North and
headed directly for Puerto Rico. When the storm made landfall on Puerto Rico it had
reached category 4 strength. The storm continued on a northwest track and its strength
fluctuated between category 3 and 4, as it approached the United States. When Hugo
made landfall near Charleston, South Carolina, it was a strong category 4 hurricane. The
damage investigated in this report occurred at the Charleston Air Force Base. An
illustration showing the approximate location of the Charleston AFB and track of this
hurricane can be seen in Figure 3.3.
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Hurricane Andrew began as a tropical depression on August 1 6, 1 992 at latitude
1 1° North and longitude 35° West. Andrew's initial position was approximately 1,500
miles east of the north end of South America. The storm took a northwesterly course and
strengthened steadily as it moved toward the Florida coastline. It reached category 4
strength before it first made landfall on the southern tip of Florida. As it moved across
Florida, it lost strength down to a category 3 hurricane before entering the Gulf of
Mexico. After entering the Gulf of Mexico, Andrew again gained strength and turned
north toward Louisiana. When the storm struck Louisiana about 100 miles west ofNew
Orleans, it had again reached category 4 strength. After making landfall, the storm
quickly turned to the East and lost strength, dissipating entirely before reaching North
Carolina.
The damage investigated in this report occurred as Hurricane Andrew passed over
the southern tip of Florida. The location of the approximate location of the damage is
indicated on Figure 3.4. The track of Hurricane Andrew and its corresponding strength
can also be seen in Figure 3.4.
20
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Figure 3.4 Tracking Map for Hurricane Andrew
3.5 Altus, Oklahoma Tornado
Along with the hurricanes mentioned above, there was also a tornado that caused
damage to several low rise steel structures in Altus, Oklahoma. The tornado touched
down on the southwest side of Altus Air Force Base on May 11, 1982. The tornado
traveled northeast across the base and dissipated as it reached the northeast perimeter.
The tornado was estimated to be approximately 1600 feet wide and the maximum
strength was classified as F3 (McDonald et al., 1983). An illustration showing the
strength of the storm and its path is provided in Figure 3.5, on the following page
(McDonald et al., 1983). Of particular note are buildings 279 and 285, both of which are








BUILDING DAMAGE: DOCUMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
As mentioned earlier, all of the damage documentation for the case studies
presented in this chapter were obtained from the Texas Tech Institute for Disaster
Research (IDR) archives. The case studies discussed in the following sections provide a
representative sample of the damage documented. Although numerous case studies are
available in the IDR archives, the examples provided in this chapter were chosen because
they best represent both the scope and type of damage that was observed on low-rise
heavy steel structures.
4.1 Hurricane Frederic: Building 3
Location and Site Conditions
The subject structure is a large supply warehouse located on a canal that branches
off Mobile Bay. Mobile Bay is located on the east side of Mobile, Alabama. The area
around the site can be generally classified as an open area, exposure C as defined in
ASCE 7-95.
Description of Structure
The supply warehouse is approximately 70 feet wide and 120 feet long. The
columns are standard wide flange steel shapes and are approximately 35 feet tall. Custom
designed open web joist girders run parallel to the short side of the building and attach
directly to the three wide flange columns placed in lines parallel with the short side of the
23
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building. The joist girders are spaced approximately 30 feet apart going down the long
side of the building. Smaller standard open web joists run perpendicular to the main joist
girders. The exterior cladding and roofing consists of corrugated metal siding of an
unknown thickness and pattern.
Wind Speed Analysis
The large supply building was damaged by Hurricane Frederic in September of
1979. Although wind direction can shift during the course of a hurricane, the winds were
generally coming from the southwest. Reliable anemometer data was available from a
NWS site at the Mobile Airport and from the Coast Guard Cutter Salvia. Both of these
anemometers were located within 3 miles of the structure. The maximum wind speeds
recorded at these stations varied between 1 00 mph and 1 1 mph depending on the
recording site chosen (Reinhold, 1979). The reliability of this wind speed data is
excellent and it generally agrees with the hurricane tracking chart that was shown
previously in Figure 3.1.
Description of Damage
This warehouse building sustained no significant structural damage, as can be
seen in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The only damage noted was the failure of several large
overhead doors and the removal of some of the corrugated metal roof and wall panels.
Analysis of Damage
The probable cause of the roof and wall panel failure was the prior failure of the
large overhead doors located on the side of the building running parallel to the railroad
tracks, as seen in Figure 4.1
.
These overhead doors failed due to positive pressure
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generated by wind blowing normal to the surface of the doors. Once the two overhead
doors failed, the internal pressure inside the building increased and the roof panels and
siding were torn from the structure due to the combined internal and external pressure.
Points of Interest
There are several important points to note in the damage done to this structure.
First, there was little or no damage done to the steel framing and girts supporting the
overhead doors. This indicates that either the door curtain had insufficient structural
capacity to transfer the wind load to the frame, or that the door tracks deflected enough to
allow the curtain guides to separate from the tracks. Regardless of the mechanism, the
failure of these and other overhead doors has been observed repeatedly in other structures
that sustained damage.
The second point to notice is the lack of damage to any of the wall girts or roof
joists that supported the damaged panels. The lack of damage to the girts and joists can
be attributed to a combination of the small vertical spacing of the girts, approximately
three feet, the use of heavy "C" channel sections, and the premature failure of the
corrugated siding. It is important to note that since the siding failed, the girts were
probably not subjected to the maximum wind loads.
The last item to notice is the mode of failure of the corrugated panels. Since the
screws remained in the girts after failure, this indicates that either the fastener spacing
was too large, the heads of the fasteners were too small, or the thickness of the corrugated
siding was insufficient to prevent the corrugated siding from experiencing localized




Figure 4. 1 South Exterior Elevation of Building 3
Figure 4.2 West Exterior Elevation of Building 3
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Figure 4.3 Interior Elevation of Building 3
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4.2 Tornado at Altus, Oklahoma: Building 279
Location and Site Conditions
Building 279 is the designation for both a standard low rise wood frame structure
and a separate parachute drying tower. Both of these structures are located just east of
building 285 on Altus AFB, as shown previously in Figure 3.5. The structure of interest
is the parachute drying tower. The parachute drying tower is a free standing structure
located adjacent to the northeast corner of building 279. The area around building 279 is
generally unobstructed and classifies as open terrain, exposure C, as defined by ASCE 7-
95.
Description of Structure
The parachute drying tower is a steel frame structure that is 15'-6" wide, 28'-6"
long, and 62 '-4" tall. The tower has four wide flange steel columns and various wide
flange beams. A plan view of the structure can be seen in Figure 4.4. The tower is
structurally braced against sidesway by double angles that are attached to the four
columns at intermediate levels as shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. These cross braces
transfer the lateral loads into the columns and the columns transfer the loads into the
foundation via base plates and four 5/8" diameter A307 bolts as shown in Figure 4.7. The
exterior walls of the tower are covered with corrugated asbestos siding.
Since the parachute drying tower is a very "simple" structure, the analysis of the
failure of this structure provides a good estimate of the wind speeds generated by the
tornado. The main reason for the inclusion of the tower failure in this report is to provide
a valid estimate of the wind speed that caused damage to building 285. Building 285 is a
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heavy steel structure that was also damaged by the Altus tornado and will be discussed in
detail in the next section. Building 285 is located approximately 600 feet from the tower.
Although Building 285 is located 600 feet from the tower, both structures are in a line
that is parallel to the path of the tornado and thus they experienced approximately the































Figure 4.5 Drawing, Parachute Tower
East Elevation



















As seen in Figure 4.8, the parachute drying tower was totally destroyed by the
Altus tornado. The failure of the tower was caused by excessive wind loads on the
windward and leeward walls. These wind loads were sufficient to cause the anchor bolts
on the southeast and northeast columns to fail in tension. Once the anchor bolts failed,
the overturning moment generated by the easterly wind caused the building to rotate
about the other two columns and collapse. A close up of the anchor bolt failure can be
seen in Figure 4.9 and a close up of the column base plate in Figure 4.10. Figure 4.10
shows definitively that the base plate did not fail.










Figure 4.9 Anchor Bolt Failure, Parachute Tower
—**
•y ;F?
Figure 4.10 Column Base Plate, Parachute Tower
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Analysis of Wind Speed
The wind that caused the collapse of the parachute tower was generated by the
Altus, Oklahoma tornado that was described earlier in Section 3.5. The wind caused the
collapse of the parachute tower by generating enough force to cause failure of the column
anchor bolts and also overcome the righting moment generated by the weight of the
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Figure 4. 1 1 Forces Acting on Parachute Tower
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An estimate of the wind speed necessary to cause the failure of the tower was
determined using the following conditions and assumptions:
1
.
The wind pressure varied over the height of the tower according to the
distribution pattern shown in ASCE 7-95.
2. The maximum static wind load acted normal to the longest dimension of
the building in plan view.
3. The stress in the four A3 07 anchor bolts was equal prior to failure.
4. The atmospheric pressure changes did not appreciably contribute to the
collapse of the structure.
5. The external pressure coefficients acting on the building surfaces are as
follows:
Windward wall Cp = 0.8
Leeward wall Cp = -0.3
Roof Cp = -1.3
6. The gust effect factor applied to the external pressure coefficients is .86.
7. The total weight of the structure was 67,269 pounds. This weight was
calculated from as-built drawings of the tower. Detailed information on
these calculations can be found in Appendix A.
The assumption that the wind velocity on the windward side of the structure
varies with the height of the structure is consistent with ASCE 7-95. Although some
literature suggests that the wind speed in tornadoes does not vary appreciably with height,
no concrete proof of this theory exists. Assumptions two and three are fairly obvious and
require no additional explanation. Assumption four is substantiated by investigations of
other tornado damage by McDonald et al., 1987. Since no other concrete theory exists to
warrant the use of other exposure coefficients, the ones found in ASCE 7-95 were used.
Assumption six is an adjustment that was made to the normal gust factor of .85,
recommended in ASCE 7-95. The gust factor was calculated using the complete analysis
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equations given in the commentary ofASCE 7-95. The complete analysis was used to
account for any increase in the gust effect factor caused by the slenderness of the
parachute tower. The equations and the detailed calculations used to obtain the gust factor
can be found in Appendix A. Once these assumptions have been made and justified, the
calculation of the maximum wind velocity proceeded as shown in the following
paragraph.
The load capacity of one of the anchor bolts, <j)Rn , is defined by the following
equation (AISC, 1995).
4>R„ = <|>Fu(Ae)
cf) is a resistance reduction factor and is normally equal to 0.75 for design purposes. This
resistance reduction factor accounts for the possibility of material imperfection, and the
uncertainty level inherent in the failure mechanism. For the purposes of forensic
engineering calculations, it is reasonable to assume a (j) factor of 1 .0 since the bolt
manufacturers typically ensure their products exceed the minimum design strength. Fu is
the ultimate fracture stress of the bolt, 60 ksi for A307 bolts. Ae is the net tensile area of
one bolt, taking into account the reduction in tensile area due to the threads. Table 8-7 in
AISC, 1995 lists a value of .226 in2 for 5/8" diameter A307 bolts. The capacity of one
5/8" diameter A307 bolts is then equal to 60(.226) or 13.6 kips. The total resistive force
of the eight anchor bolts is 108.5 kips. The total righting moment, M r , is equal to the sum
of the righting forces multiplied by their respective moment arms. In this case, M r is
equal to 108.5(15.5') + 67.27(7.75') or 2,203 ft*kips. Next, the overturning moment,
M
,
due to the wind loading on the parachute tower was calculated using a modified form
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of the basic wind load equation found in ASCE 7-95. The equation used in the
spreadsheet is provided below and the detailed calculations can be found in Appendix A.
M = I[(q*G*C p*A*ez)/(I*Kz)]
G = Positive pressure gust effect factor, taken as 1 .
1
ez = Moment arm of the wind force (ft)
Cp = External pressure coefficient
GCpi = Combined gust factor and internal pressure coefficient
A = Projected area normal to wind force (ft2)
I, Kz , & qz were defined previously in Section 2.3
Using this approach, the overturning moment, M , was found to be 45.9q ft* kips, where q
is the wind pressure on the structure. Equating the righting moment, M r, and the
overturning moment, M
,
and solving for q, the wind pressure was determined to be
approximately 48.0 psf. The minimum wind velocity to cause failure is then calculated
using the equation, V = -
N
/q/.00256 . Using this equation the minimum failure wind
velocity was found to be 136 mph.
It should be noted that an analysis of the failure of this structure was previously
conducted by researchers at Texas Tech University using the ANSI A58. 1-1982 standard
(Mehta, 1976; McDonald et al., 1983). The wind speed calculations in this report were
independently performed using the wind load provisions ofASCE 7-95. This
independent analysis was performed to validate the earlier analysis. Even though some
portions of the ASCE 7-95 vary substantially from the previous ANSI A58.1-1982
standard, the wind speeds estimated using both standards were very comparable. The
earlier analysis calculated the wind speed to be 116 mph while an analysis using current
codes shows the wind speed to be approximately 136 mph. The reason for the difference
between the analyses is that the earlier analysis assumed that the wind pressure on the
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windward wall was constant and did not vary with height, as did the current analysis.
Another contributing reason was that the external pressure coefficients changed for the
leeward wall and the roof from the ANSI A58.1-1982 standard to the ASCE 7-95
standard.
Points of Interest
Since the majority of the siding remained attached to the structure, the main
structural elements were subjected to the maximum wind loads possible. One could
speculate that if the siding had failed, the corresponding reduction in wind loading on the
main structure would have been sufficient to allow the main structure to survive.
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4.3 Tornado at Altus, Oklahoma: Building 285
Location and Site Conditions
Building 285 is located on the east side of Altus AFB in Altus, Oklahoma. Altus
is located in the southeast corner of Oklahoma, just north of the Texas border. The area
around building 279 is generally unobstructed and classifies as open terrain, exposure C,
as defined by ASCE 7-95.
Description of Structure
Building 285 is a large hangar that is approximately 500 feet wide, 600 feet long
and 70 feet tall. The columns are standard wide flange shapes and the girders that span
between the columns and run parallel to the short side of the building are custom
fabricated trusses. The lateral load resisting system is made up of steel cross bracing.
The exterior walls of the hangar are covered with asbestos cement (transite) siding of an
unknown thickness and pattern. The roof is covered with sheets of 1 8 gage corrugated
metal decking that is 30 inches wide and 8 feet long. The corrugations in the decking are
1-1/2 inches deep and the ribs are spaced 6 inches apart. The corrugated decking is
covered by rigid insulation board. The insulation board is then covered by standard hot
mopped, built up roofing. The front of the hangar is enclosed by a series of large door
sections that are 65 feet tall and 20 feet wide. These door sections travel along a series of
rails at the bottom and are restrained at the top by door guides.
Wind Speed Analysis
Building 285 was damaged by the Altus, Oklahoma tornado on May 1 1, 1982. A
detailed description of this storm was provided earlier in Section 3.5. As shown by the
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calculations in Section 4.2 of this chapter, the maximum wind speeds experienced near
Building 285 were approximately 136 mph. This wind speed was estimated based on the
previous analysis of the parachute tower failure.
Description of Damage
Overall, the hangar performed well when subjected to these severe winds. The
exterior corrugated asbestos siding performed well and experienced only localized failure.
There were no failures noted in the heavy "C" channel wall girts or the roof trusses
supporting the corrugated siding and the roof decking, respectively. No failures were
noted on the main structural elements. The only damage to this building was the removal
of a portion of the roofing material and the roof decking, structural damage to two rail
mounted hangar door sections, and the removal of exterior corrugated siding along the
door pockets. The damage to the hangar is shown in Figures 4.12 through 4.17.
Figure 4.12 Aerial View of Damage to Building 285
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Figure 4.13 Elevation of the North
SideofBldg285
Figure 4.14 Interior Elevation of Damaged
Hangar Door
Figure 4. 1 5 Section View of Damaged
Hangar Door




Figure 4. 1 7 Interior of Building 285, NW Corner of Roof




As previously mentioned, the elements of the structure that were damaged include
two sections of the hangar doors, the corrugated siding, the roof covering, and the roof
decking. Since this structure is located over 500 miles from the nearest coastline, the
maximum design wind speed used by the designers was probably less than 100 mph.
Since the wind speeds experienced by the structure were approximately 30 percent faster
than the design wind speed, the resulting loads were over 50 percent larger than the
design loads. Under these extreme wind loads, the small amount of damage as seen in the
previous figures is expected. However, an analysis of the damage is still useful to
determine the weak points in the structure and identify areas where improvements can
easily be made.
The partial failure of two sections of the hangar door, as seen in Figures 4.13,
4.14, and 4.15 was caused by wind acting normal to the door surface and weakness in the
free edges of the door sections. Because of the secondary openings in the door sections,
they did not have a continuous member along their free edge. This lack of a continuous
member weakened the structural framing and the lighter secondary framing was unable to
transfer the loads into the upper header and the lower rail seen in Figure 4.15. This
failure was most likely not due to either a design or a construction deficiency but was
simply an area of the structure that had little redundancy.
The majority of the damage to the roof covering seen in Figure 4.12 is along the
edges of the roof line. This damage is consistent with the higher suction pressures that
are typically experienced at the leading edges of a structure with a flat roof. One other
factor that may have precipitated the damage to the roof membrane is the partial failure of
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the metal edge flashing seen in Figure 4.13. When this edge flashing failed, it allowed
wind to propagate under the roof membrane thus causing failure of the roof membrane
located just under the flashing. The failure of this edge flashing can be directly attributed
to the lack of a retaining cleat on the free edge of the flashing as specified by the
SMACNA Architectural Sheet Metal Manual, 1993.
The localized failure of the corrugated metal decking can be seen in Figure 4.17.
It is important to note that the decking only failed in one, highly localized area, where the
structure would have experienced the largest peak roof suction pressures. As can be seen
in Figure 4.18, the corrugated decking was tack welded to the structural framing at each
of the ribs. Although the size and quality of the tack welds is still questionable, it is
reasonable to assume that construction problems were not the major factor in the decking
failure. The only other factor that could have contributed to the failure of the corrugated
roof decking is the prior partial failure of the hangar doors. When the hangar door
sections deflected, this may have allowed the internal pressure in the hangar to increase.
This increased positive internal pressure would then combine with the roof suction
pressure and contribute to the failure of the decking at the locations of the highest
external suction pressure.
The localized damage to the corrugated siding can be seen in the aerial
photograph of the hangar, Figure 4.12 and on an exterior elevation of the door pocket,
Figure 4.16. The damage seen in Figure 4.16 is primarily due to high localized suction
pressure caused by wind acting normal to the front face of the hangar. The localized
failure of the siding was caused by the high suction pressures generated by the normal
wind and by the irregular shape of the structure. Another factor that could have
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contributed to the failure of the siding was the prior partial failure of the two hangar door
sections. When the hangar door sections deflected, this may have allowed the internal
pressure inside the hangar and the door pocket to increase. This increased positive
internal pressure could combine with the high leeward suction pressure and contribute to
the siding failure.
Points of Interest
One significant point to note about the damage to this structure is that the main
structural system sustained virtually no damage even though the applied wind loads may
have been over 50 percent larger than the design loads. Another point to note is the good
performance of the girts and corrugated siding. In fact, the siding experienced only
localized damage at each of the south hangar door pockets. The performance of the girts
and siding can be mainly attributed to the narrow girt spacing, approximately four feet,
and the excellent performance of the main structural system. Although there was no
significant damage to the main structural elements, there are several essential points to
note about the damage to the hangar doors, siding, and roofing.
The only failure of the roofing and siding were in areas of flow separation, thus
areas of very high suction pressure. These areas are the same areas where the wind tunnel
testing described in Section 2.2 underestimated the peak suction pressures.
44

4.4 Hurricane Gilbert: Large Warehouse Building
Location and Site Conditions
The structure is located on Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. San
Antonio is located approximately 150 miles north of the Gulf of Mexico as shown in
Figure 3.2. Since this building is located in an area of the base adjacent to one of the
large runways, the terrain can be classified as open and unobstructed, exposure C, as
defined by ASCE 7-95.
Description of Structure
The structure is a large flat roofed supply warehouse with exterior concrete
masonry unit (CMU) walls. The main structural components include interior wide flange
columns, custom designed open web steel joists running the length of the building, and
standard open web steel joists spanning the width of the building. The lateral wind loads
are transferred to the foundations via CMU shear walls.
Analysis of Wind Speed
The large supply warehouse was damaged by a tornado that was spawned by
Hurricane Gilbert as it passed some 120 miles south of San Antonio as shown previously
in Figure 3.2. Since this structure is located far inland and away from the path of
Hurricane Gilbert, it felt virtually no direct effects of the hurricane winds.
There is very little data available on the wind speeds generated by the tornado that
caused the damage to this structure. Also since no "simple" structures were damaged in
the immediate area, back calculation of the wind speed is not possible. However, the
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tornado was rated a weak F3 based on the damage done to several buildings in the area.
The F3 damage indicates wind speeds between 1 50 and 1 70 mph.
Description of Damage
The main structural system performed well and sustained very little damage as did
the large overhead doors, shown in Figure 4.19. The only damage to the main structural
system was a horizontal crack in the CMU shear wall. The other element damaged was
the corrugated steel roof decking. Approximately 80% of the corrugated steel roof deck
was torn from the building. The damage mentioned can be seen in 4.20 and 4.21
.
Figure 4.19 Undamaged Overhead Door
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Figure 4.20 Interior of Supply Warehouse




Since the overhead doors performed well and no other openings in this structure
failed, an increase in the building internal pressure could not have been a contributing
factor in the failure of the roof decking. The decking either failed because of inadequate
spot welding or because the external pressure on the roofing exceeded the strength of the
roofing material. Since the roof damage was so extensive and since there was little roof
damage to similar structures in the area, the failure was most likely caused by a
inadequate attachment of the roof panels. Although not definitive, the inconsistency in
the spot welding can be deduced from careful inspection of Figure 4.21 . As shown in
Figure 4.21, only the spot welds on the outside ribs held. The welds on the interior ribs
either failed prematurely or were never completed.
Points of Interest
Again, one point to note is that the main structural system of the building
performed very well. Although the wind loads were probably at or above design levels,
none of the main structural elements sustained any damage. The other item to note is that
the failure of the corrugated roof panels was not precipitated by the failure of any other
exterior cladding components. The final item worth noting is that none of the roof panels
along the edges of the roof wall junction remained. This is significant because the roof




4.5 Hurricane Hugo: Large Aircraft Hangar
Location and Site Conditions
The subject structure is located on Charleston Air Force Base in Charleston, South
Carolina. Charleston AFB is located less than a mile from the Atlantic coast as seen in
Figure 3.3. This building is located adjacent to one of the large runways, thus the terrain
can be classified as open and unobstructed, exposure C, as defined by ASCE 7-95.
Description of Structure
The large hangar is very similar to the hangar that was previously examined in
Section 4.3. The structure is approximately 500 feet wide, 600 feet long and 60 feet tall.
The designers used standard wide flange shapes for the columns. The girders that span
between the columns and run parallel to the short side of the building are custom
fabricated trusses. The lateral load resisting system is made up of steel cross bracing.
The exterior walls of the hangar are covered with corrugated metal siding of an unknown
thickness and pattern. The virtually flat roof is also covered with sheets of 22 gage
corrugated metal decking of an unknown pattern. The corrugated decking is covered by
rigid insulation board and the insulation board is then covered by standard hot mopped,
built-up roofing. The front of the hangar is enclosed by a series of large door sections.
These door sections travel along a series of rails at the bottom and are restrained at the top
by door guides.
Wind Speed Analysis
The subject structure was damaged by Hurricane Hugo as is passed near
Charleston, South Carolina on September 22, 1989. A detailed description of this storm
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was provided earlier in Section 3.3. Wind data on this storm was available from a variety
of sources, but the closest reliable anemometer data was obtained from Charleston
WBAS. This weather station recorded a peak gust of 85 kts at an elevation of 20 feet in
exposure C (McDonald et al., 1990). The term peak gust from the reporting weather
station is interpreted as a one to two second average. Since the defining parameters of the
reported wind speed differ from the standard values, they must be converted. After the
appropriate conversions have been applied the equivalent three second gust velocity at 33
feet above ground in exposure C is calculated to be 108 mph. Since this peak wind speed
is well below the design wind speed specified by either ASCE 7-88 or ASCE 7-95, the
structure should have sustained very little damage, if any.
Description of Damage
The only visible damage to this hangar is damage to the roof covering and
decking. All of the structural members performed as designed, as did the corrugated
metal siding. All of the windows in the structure remained intact, as did the hangar
doors. These observations of the extent of the damage generally agree with the
assessment by McDonald and Smith, 1990. The extent of the damage can be seen in
Figures 4.22 and 4.23.
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Figure 4.22 Exterior Elevation of Large Hangar




It appears that the roof decking was lifted off the joists by suction pressure that
formed due to wind acting normal to the hangar doors. Since none of the windows on the
exterior of the structure were damaged and the hangar doors were also undamaged, it is
unlikely that a large increase in the buildings internal pressure could have contributed to
the damage of the panels. If the provisions ofASCE 7-95 are applied to the wind
recorded velocity of 108 mph and an internal pressure coefficient of +/- .18 is used, the
decking had to resist a total suction pressure of 33 psf. The equations used to calculate
this pressure are p = qGCp - q(GCpi) and q = 0.00256*KZ*I*V
2
. The details of the
calculations made to obtain this pressure are as follows q = (.00256* 1.17*1*1 08
2
) = 34.9
psf and p = (34.9*.85*-.9) - (34.9*. 18) = 33 psf. Since this pressure is well below the
required building code value, either the contractor did not properly fasten the decking
with spot welds or ASCE 7-95 underestimates the peak suction pressures at areas of flow
separation.
Points of Interest
Once again, one point to note is that the main structural system of the building
performed very well. Although the wind loads were near design levels, none of the main
structural elements sustained any damage. The other item to note is that the roof decking
failed when subjected to wind velocities and pressures below design values. The area of
the failure was also limited to the windward wall/roofjunction, similar to the damage
observed on building 285 on Altus, AFB. The final item of interest is that the damage
observed on the two hangars is very similar despite the fact that one was damaged by a
hurricane and the other was damaged by a tornado.
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4.6 Hurricane Andrew: Aircraft Hangars
Location and Site Conditions
The subject structures are located at the Miami International airport in Miami,
Florida. The approximate location of the structure is indicated Figure 3.4 along with the
proximity of the storm path to the structures. The area is flat with few obstructions and
classifies as exposure C as defined by ASCE 7-95.
Description of Structures
The Beechcraft hangar shown in Figures 4.23, 4.24, and 4.25 is approximately
200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 40 feet tall. The structure has a gable roof with a very
slight pitch (approximately 1/4" per foot). The exterior walls are covered with corrugated
metal siding and the roof is covered with corrugated metal decking. The main structural
system is made up of wide flange steel columns, large custom girders, and z shape roof
purlins. The lateral loads are transferred to the foundation via steel cross bracing running
between the columns. All of the main structural elements can be seen in Figure 4.25.
The other two hangars that are shown in Figure 4.26 are very similar in size and
construction to the Beechcraft hangar.
Analysis of Wind Speed
The three structures shown in Figures 4.23 through 4.26 were all damaged by
Hurricane Andrew in August of 1992. Since these structures are located at an airport,
reliable anemometer data was readily available. Anemometers at the site recorded a





The main component that was damaged on all three hangars was the roof decking.
The corrugated siding on the front of the Beechcraft hangar also received minor damage
at the door pocket, see Figure 4.25.




Figure 4.25 Elevation of Beechcraft Hangar
Figure 4.26 Interior Elevation of Beechcraft Hangar
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Figure 4.27 Aerial View ofTwo Damaged Hangars
Analysis of Damage
The pattern of failure of the roof decking is very similar to that seen in the
previous structures. The roof decking performed well over the majority of the roof and
failed only within four to six feet of the edge of the windward wall. Since the roof
decking used on these hangars was attached with screws at an interval determined by the
manufacturer's catalog data, it is unlikely that construction error is the cause of the
failure. In addition, since the wind velocities were less than 120 mph, the roof decking
should not have sustained any damage.
Points of Interest
One main point to notice is that the primary structure performed very well and
sustained virtually no damage. Another important point is that when the roof decking
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was torn from the purlins, the purlins were left undamaged. This indicates that either
there were an insufficient number of fasteners or the fasteners did not have sufficient
contact surface area with the decking to prevent localized failure of the decking material





The case studies provided in this report are examples of the types of damage that
was observed on low rise open span steel structures. Similar damage to numerous other
structures is documented in the Texas Tech Wind Library, but due to the limited space
available for this report, the number of case studies was limited to those given.
Although many examples of damage were observed in the preparation of this
report, and the patterns of failure were all found to be very similar, care must be taken in
drawing conclusions from such rough analysis. Likewise, the conclusions that are
reached should be kept in the context of the report and the limitations of the available
wind velocity data and other parameters should be carefully considered. However, as
limited as the data is, it does provide valuable qualitative information about the
performance of low-rise heavy steel structures when subjected to design level wind
velocities.
5.1 Conclusions
The main structural systems of the buildings studied all performed very well. In fact,
after reviewing over 1000 damage photographs from seven different storm events, no
instance of main structural failure was noted for a low rise, heavy steel structure. The
excellent performance of the main structural systems is most likely the result of a
combination of one or more of the following factors:
1) Good prediction of the total wind loads by the wind standards.
2) The large degree of structural redundancy in heavy steel structures.
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3) Good construction practices and qualified workers on these larger, custom
designed projects.
4) Code requirements for the connections to be stronger than the structural
members being joined together.
In contrast to the excellent performance of the main structural systems, the
overhead doors performed poorly. In numerous instances, the overhead doors were the
first components to fail. Their initial failure then precipitated further damage to the
structure such as damage to the roof decking and exterior wall cladding. Although a
detailed analysis of the failure of the overhead doors was not conducted, several other
researchers have noted similar damage and have found that typically excessive deflection
in the door curtains allows the rollers to rotate out of the guide rails, thus causing the
failure of the doors (FEMA, 1992).
Another component that performed very poorly were the roof panels. In almost
every instance of damage to a heavy steel structures, the roof decking failed at the
junction of the windward wall and the roof. This failure was noted regardless of the
fastening system, whether spot welding or screws. This consistent failure could be the
result of construction errors, design errors or an underestimation of the peak loads by the
wind standards. Construction error is a possibility, but it is highly improbable that the
errors would be made in the same areas on a variety of structures built by different
contractors. Design errors can explain some of the failures since current practice does not
require additional fasteners in areas of higher suction pressure. Another viable
explanation for the consistent damage is that the design wind standards underestimation




The recommendations made in this report deal primarily with the construction and
design of overhead doors, roof decking, and wall siding. Much more design attention
needs to be placed on the specification of certified overhead doors if the buildings are
constructed in high wind areas or house high value materials. There are currently many
manufacturers that offer commercially available doors that have the structural capacity to
resist design wind velocities. These manufacturers can provide test results from
Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) or other independent testing agencies to prove their
viability. Since quality doors are available, it is the responsibility of the design engineer
to specify the proper door and educate his client as to its importance. Although providing
quality overhead doors will not ensure that the structure is not damaged, without it,
extensive damage is a foregone conclusion.
The poor performance of the roof decking and wall siding in areas of peak suction
pressure needs to be addressed in a different manner. In the short run, designers should
increase the number of fasteners used on roof and wall siding in areas where high peak
suction pressures can occur, namely at roof/wall junctions and at sharp changes in
building geometry. In the long run, more research needs to be done to ensure that the
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U(z) = 2.5* U'\n(z/zQ )
U(z): Mean wind velocity at height z U*: Friction velocity for a given terrain
z: Height above ground z : Roughness length for a given terrain





2 ) ln(z 2 /z )
U(z i): Mean wind velocity at height z , U(z 2): Mean wind velocity at height z 2
z
, & 2 : Height above ground z : Roughness length for a given terrain
Modified Form for Converting Averaging Times
t/,(z) #M0
' £/3600 (Z ) 2.5*ln(z/z )
(7'- t7
™» *'
t/,(z): Mean wind velocity at height z averaged over time t seconds
£/360o(z): Mean wind velocity at height z averaged over time of 3600 seconds
ft: Variable to account for the change in the fluctuations in the longitudinal
turbulence for different roughness lengths
c{t)\ Variable to account for the difference between the sample averaging time and
the averaging time of 3600 seconds
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CONVERSION OF FUJITA SCALE FASTEST 1/4 MILE WIND
TO A FASTEST 3 SECOND WIND
MMile
nd Speed W P c(W) z Zo R, U360o c(t3) R2 u3
40 22.500 6 1.9325 33 0.2297 1.3812 28.961 2.849 1.5619 45.24
72 12.500 6 2.24 33 0.2297 1.4418 49.937 2.849 1.5619 78.00
73 12.329 6 2.2455 33 0.2297 1.4429 50.592 2.849 1.5619 79.02
112 8.036 6 2.468 33 0.2297 1.4868 75.330 2.849 1.5619 117.66
113 7.965 6 2.4738 33 0.2297 1.4879 75.944 2.849 1.5619 118.62
157 5.732 6 2.6424 33 0.2297 1.5212 103.208 2.849 1.5619 161.21
158 5.696 6 2.6452 33 0.2297 1.5217 103.829 2.849 1.5619 162.17
206 4.369 6 2.7455 33 0.2297 1.5415 133.634 2.849 1.5619 208.73
207 4.348 6 2.7471 33 0.2297 1.5418 134.256 2.849 1.5619 209.70
260 3.462 6 2.8140 33 0.2297 1.5550 167.198 2.849 1.5619 261.15
261 3.448 6 2.8150 33 0.2297 1.5552 167.820 2.849 1.5619 262.12
318 2.830 6 2.8617 33 0.2297 1.5645 203.266 2.849 1.5619 317.49
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Weight Calculations for Parachute Drying Tower
Damaged in Altus, Oklahoma Tornado
Length Width Area No. of Weight




Corrugated Asbestos Siding 3.5 49.71 28.5 1,417 2 9,917
3.5 49.71 15.5 771 2 5,394
Framing - Vertical 2x4 @ 24" o.c. 0.7 61.375 28.5 1,749 2 2,449
Framing - Horizontal 1x3 @ 16" o.c. 0.4 61.375 15.5 951 2 761
Wall Insulation Bart Ins. 0.7 61.375 26.5 1,626 2 2,277
0.7 61.375 13.5 829 2 1,160
1/4" Asbestos Bd. 2 61.375 26.5 1,626 2 6,506
2 61.375
ROOF
13.5 829 2 3,314
Built Up Roofing 6 15.5 28.5 442 2,651
Metal Roof Deck 2 15.5 28.5 442 884
Roof Insulation Rigid Board 1 15.5 28.5 442 442
Framing 2x4 @ 24" o.c. 0.7 15.5 28.5 442 309
Framing 1x3 @ 16" o.c. 0.4 15.5 28.5 442 177
Fixtures & Ceiling 3 13.5 26.5 358 1,073
Ceiling Insulation 4" Bart 1 13.5 26.5 358 358




Length No. of Weight
Description Member Size Wt/ft (ft) Members (lbs)
STRUCrURAL STEEL
Columns W6xl5.5 15.5 62.33 4 3,864
Cross Brace L3x2- 1/2x1/4 4.5 13.46 6 363
Cross Brace L3x2-l/2xl/4 4.5 11.88 2 107
Cross Brace L3x2- 1/2x1/4 4.5 15.13 2 136
Cross Brace L4x3xl/4 5.8 18 6 626
Cross Brace L4x3xl/4 5.8 16.85 2 195
Cross Brace L4x3xl/4 5.8 19.29 2 224
Wall Beam W10x21 21 28.5 8 4,788
Wall Beam 8B13 13 15.5 8 1,612
Wall Girt C8xll.5 11.5 15.5 8 1,426
Wall Girt C8xll.5 11.5 28.5 8 2,622
Per. Floor Beam W 16x36 36 15.5 2 1,116
Per. Floor Beam W 16x36 36 28.5 2 2,052
Floor Girder W 12x27 27 28.5 3 2,309
Floor Beam 13x5.7 5.7 15.5 9 795
Roof Beam W10x21 21 15.5 2 651
Roof Beam W 12x27 27 28.5 2 1,539










Wt = 67,269 lbs
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Calculations to Determine Gust Effect Factor
For Parachute Drying Tower
For exposure C c=l/5.0 c = .20 ^=500'
b= 15.5' h = 62.3' z = 62.3'



























G = 0.9 (l +
7*.18*.92)"




Wind Load Calculations for Parachute Tower
Damaged in Alius, Oklahoma Tornado
Beginning Ending
Height Heig tit Area e Moment
(ft) (ft) I Kz G Cp (ft2) (ft) (ft*lbs)
Windward Moment
13 15 1 0.85 0.86 0.8 57 14 646
15 20 1 0.9 0.86 0.8 142.5 17.5 1,906
20 25 1 0.94 0.86 0.8 142.5 22.5 2,347
25 30 1 0.98 0.86 0.8 142.5 27.5 2,751
30 40 1 1.04 0.86 0.8 285 35 6,599
40 50 1 1.09 0.86 0.8 285 45 8,095
50 62 1 1.13 0.86 0.8 342 56 11,661
Leeward Moment
13 62 1 1.13 0.86 0.7 441.75 37.5 8,825
Roof Moment





13 62 1 1.13 1 0.18 1396.5 7.75 1,724
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